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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the factors underlying the gender gap in African electoral 
and inter-electoral political participation. Drawing on new data covering over 27,000 respondents from 
246 regions in 20 emerging African democracies, the empirical findings suggest that while there is a 
gender gap in both voting and inter-electoral participation, the latter is larger. Whereas several of the 
investigated individual and contextual characteristics are found to be important determinants of 
participation, they explain only a very modest share of the observed gender gaps. We do find, however, 
that gender gaps in education are negatively correlated with female inter-electoral participation and that 
gender gaps in employment are negatively related to female voting. Interestingly, and contrary to 
suggestions in previous research, there is no evidence that religiosity at the individual or community level 
increases the gender differences in political activity.  
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1 Introduction 
Political participation tends to be unequally distributed across citizens (Bartels, 2005; Brady 
et al., 1995; Griffin and Newman, 2005; Isaksson, 2010; Lijphart, 1997; Verba et al., 1995). 
Since this may affect what policy issues are brought to the agenda, it could have far-reaching 
consequences for policy (see, e.g., Bartels, 2005; Gilens, 2005; and Griffin and Newman, 
2005), potentially reinforcing existing economic and social inequalities. Hence, broad-based 
political participation, or citizen acts to influence the selection of and/or the actions taken by 
political representatives, is important due to its intrinsic democratic value as well as from an 
inequality perspective. The present paper investigates the gender gap in African political 
participation. Can gender inequality in political participation be explained by individual 
observable characteristics, such as women being less educated and knowledgeable about the 
political process, or is it attributable to gender variation in participatory norms and unequal 
access to political networks? Given that gender differences in participation could reproduce 
gender inequalities in other domains, understanding this participatory inequality is central. 
Considering the millennium development goal to promote gender equality and empower 
women, the issue is arguably particularly pertinent in the emerging African democracies, 
where resources are scarce and women often suffer from severe inequalities in important 
dimensions such as health and education (World Bank, 2011). 
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Drawing on data covering more than 27,000 respondents from 246 regions in 20 African 
countries, our aim is to examine what factors underlie the gender gap in African electoral and 
inter-electoral political participation, evaluating the relative explanatory power of commonly 
suggested individual and contextual determinants of participation, and of gender variation in 
their distributions and effects. The empirical findings suggest that while several of the 
individual and contextual characteristics variables considered are important determinants of 
general political participation, differing observable characteristics between men and women 
explain only a modest share of the gender gap in participation. Interesting in the sense that it 
conflicts with common suggestions in previous literature, it turns out that religiosity, both at 
the individual and contextual level, does not seem to increase the gender gap in inter-electoral 
participation.  
In Western countries, the traditional gender gap in political participation – with women 
being less likely to participate politically – is in the process of closing (Inglehart and Norris, 
2000; Norris, 2002). Leading explanations of the gender gap focus on structural differences in 
individual resource endowments, often viewing female employment as the crucial factor (e.g., 
Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Ross 2008), and on cultural differences, often with religion as 
main focus (e.g., Norris and Inglehart 2004; Norris 2009).  
The sparse evidence available for developing countries, on the other hand, indicates that 
there are still important gender differences in mass political participation. A number of recent 
studies exploring the patterns of political participation in Africa note that women tend to vote 
and participate politically in between elections to a lesser extent than men (Bratton, 1999; 
Bratton and Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2010; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2010; Isaksson, 2010), 
yet we have little knowledge about what factors underlie this important inequality.  
To understand the gender gap in African political participation there is first of all reason 
to go beyond individual determinants of participation and consider the contribution of 
contextual influences. Taking into account peer effects and participatory norms, we anticipate 
that not only, say, the individual’s level of education matters for participation, but also the 
average educational level of men and women in the surrounding area. That is, we want to 
investigate whether key individual level determinants of political participation also have 
important aggregate level effects.  
Second, there is a need to allow for gender differences in the effects of central 
determinants of participation. Just as gender variation in the distribution of a variable could 
contribute to the gender gap in political participation, so could gender variation in the effect of 
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a variable. Even variables that do not necessarily differ between men and women, e.g., 
individual or community level religiosity, could contribute to the gender gap in participation 
if their effects vary with gender. Hence, when exploring the gender gap in African political 
participation, we should allow for gender variation in both the distributions and the effects of 
key individual determinants of participation, and seek to evaluate their respective contribution 
to the gender imbalance. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study focusing exclusively on exploring the factors that 
underlie the gender gap in African mass political participation, assessing the explanatory 
power of both individual and contextual determinants of participation, and of gender variation 
in their distributions and effects. The results will hopefully help us understand the basis of 
existing gender disparities in terms of democratic engagement. 
2 Understanding the gender gap in political participation 
Literature on the determinants of political participation often focuses on the role of resources, 
motivations, and recruitment networks. With respect to the gender gap in political 
participation, it is not unreasonable to assume that resources relevant for political 
participation, e.g., education and information, are differentially available to men and women, 
that motivational forces stimulating engagement, e.g., participatory norms, differ between the 
genders, and that women and men have unequal access to recruitment networks. In this 
section we discuss possible determinants of the gender gap in participation implied by the 
literature on the general determinants of participation and by previous studies specifically 
addressing gender variation in the same. Whereas some of these factors operate at the 
individual level, others are more appropriate to address at the contextual level.  
2.1 Individual determinants 
At the individual level, previous studies of gender variation in political participation have 
stressed the role of structural inequalities in individual resource endowments and 
employment, and of cultural differences originating in religious affiliations. The former 
perspective focuses on the traditional role of women in the family and the labor market, the 
idea being that gender gaps in other areas of society hinder women’s participation in politics. 
If political participation is costly, and the resources relevant for meeting these costs are 
differentially available between the genders, this could give rise to gender differences in 
political participation. The conventional finding that citizens with low incomes and little 
education participate less than their richer and more educated counterparts (see, e.g., Verba 
4 
 
and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Brady et al., 1995, and Verba et al., 1995) 
does not necessarily seem to apply when studying political participation in developing 
countries.
1
 Studies of political participation in Africa, Asia, and Latin America suggest that 
whereas education is often (but not always) positively associated with participation, poor 
people participate politically no less (if anything, they seem to participate more) than more 
well-off citizens (Bratton, 1999, 2008; Yadav, 2000; Krishna, 2002, 2008; Bratton and Logan, 
2006; Booth and Seligson, 2008; Bratton et al., 2010; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2010; Isaksson, 
2010). Nevertheless, individual resource differentials seem highly relevant to consider when 
trying to understand a gender gap in political participation. 
Education helps the individual develop the human capital needed to meet the costs of 
participation, but it also affects what people he/she comes in contact with and thus what 
participatory norms and networks he/she will face (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998). 
Hence, in terms of explaining a gender gap in participation, the influence of a gender gap in 
education is likely to go beyond that of gender variation in human capital.  
A similar story applies to employment – a factor often pointed out as central for female 
participation. Employment is thought to positively impact the individual resource base 
relevant for political participation (e.g., economic standing and human capital acquisition), 
access to recruitment networks, and motivational factors stimulating engagement (Schlozman 
et al., 1999; Norris, 2009). Studying political participation in the US, Schlozman et al. (1999) 
find that women lack these participatory factors relative to men since women are less likely to 
be employed, work full time, and hold high-level jobs. Women who are full-time homemakers 
have their traditional gender roles reinforced, the argument goes, and domestic isolation 
hinders activism since women are cut off from political discussion and networks (Schlozman 
et al., 1999). Female labor force participation, on the other hand, is argued to make women 
informed about their interests and more capable of acting on them (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 
2008). Through processes of socialization in the work place, leaving home and joining the 
paid labor force is suggested to affect women’s views and identities (Ross, 2008).2 
The focus on structural inequalities in individual resource endowments and employment 
has been challenged by a cultural perspective focusing on religious traditions and their impact 
                                                 
1
 Nor, in fact, when comparing across Western democracies other than the US (see Verba et al., 1978; Norris, 
2002) 
2
 Paid employment is, however, also time consuming (Isaksson 2010; Schlozman et al. 1999), meaning that 
working full-time may take time away from being politically active. 
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on attitudes toward gender equality in attempts to explain the relatively low number of 
women engaged in politics (Norris, 2009). The argument is that religious traditions affect 
social values, which in turn are crucial for the role of women in politics (Inglehart and Norris, 
2003a). Put differently, religion is thought to affect gender-specific participatory norms and 
thus the motivational factors stimulating engagement. It is not uncommon to single out Islam 
as particularly important in this context (Inglehart and Norris, 2003a,b; Blaydes and Linzer 
2008). In the words of Inglehart and Norris (2003a, p. 71), “an Islamic religious heritage is 
one of the most powerful barriers to the rising tide of gender equality.” Critics, however, point 
to the important variation within the cluster of Muslim countries (e.g., Charrad 2009; Rizzo et 
al. 2007). Nevertheless, studying political participation in Africa, Bratton and Logan (2006) 
find that while there is no participatory gap between Christian and Muslim men, there is a 
significantly larger gender gap in participation between Muslim men and women than 
between Christian men and women.  
2.2 Contextual determinants 
Turning to contextual determinants, several empirical studies suggest a positive influence of 
social capital and participatory norms on political participation (see, e.g., La Due Lake and 
Huckfeldt, 1998; Knack and Kropf, 1998; Krishna, 2002; Norris, 2002; and Gerber et al., 
2008). Social capital, often understood as the social networks and norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from connections among individuals  (Putnam, 2000), is described 
as the glue binding citizens together so as to enable collective action as well as the gear that 
directs citizens toward political activity (Krishna, 2002). It is suggested that individuals 
through repeated interactions with the surrounding social network – family, friends, 
colleagues, community members, etc. – learn civic norms that stimulate participation, and that 
this can constitute a powerful motivation for participation (Knack and Kropf, 1998; La Due 
Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998). 
Given the suggested importance of norms and networks, there is seemingly good reason 
to believe that contextual factors could be important for explaining a possible gender gap in 
participation. First of all, we anticipate that gender-specific participatory norms might vary 
across regions depending on systematic regional variation in the individual level determinants 
of participation discussed above. It has, for instance, been argued that once a sufficient 
number of women have entered into the paid labor force, this will stimulate female political 
participation (e.g., Andersen, 1975; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2008; Ross, 2008; and 
Schlozman, 1999). Chhibber (2002) argues that since both paid employment and political life 
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take place in the public sphere, more women working will also imply a more woman-friendly 
political sphere. According to Iversen and Rosenbluth (2008), “as women enter the labor 
market, they become part of networks and organizations (such as unions) where they are more 
likely to be exposed to political discussion and advocacy, which in turn encourages interest 
and involvement in politics” (p. 486). More women entering the labor market is also argued to 
have political consequences since the increased density of working women increases the 
likelihood for women’s organizations (Ross, 2008). Against this background, it seems 
reasonable that individual level factors will have aggregate effects; if a sufficient number of 
women get an education and become involved in paid employment, it should affect the 
participatory norms applying to women. 
Similarly, it has been suggested that religious traditions shape attitudes both at the 
individual and societal levels (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Norris, 2009). Norris (2009) 
specifically proposes that both the individual Muslim identity and living in an Islamic society 
– even as, say, a Christian or a non-believer – strengthen traditional gender norms. According 
to this line of reasoning, not only individual religious affiliation but also the level of 
religiosity in society could potentially affect political participation. 
Moreover, access to recruitment networks seems appropriate to consider at the contextual 
rather than the individual level. Studies focusing on the role of recruitment networks tend to 
evaluate the importance of involvement in political and non-political organizations like trade 
unions and community groups, which they argue act as mobilizing agencies that provide 
networks of recruitment for political participation and help citizens develop skills relevant for 
political participation (Verba et al., 1995; Bratton, 1999; Norris, 2002; Bratton and Logan, 
2006; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2010). Unequal access to such networks could potentially be an 
important factor for explaining the gender gap in participation. However, since endogeneity 
concerns make it problematic to explain individual political participation by the individual’s 
connection to recruitment networks,
3
 we will instead try to capture systematic regional 
variation in access to recruitment networks. 
An issue important to keep in mind concerns a motivational factor often pointed to in 
studies of African democratic behavior – namely, material incentives related to clientelist 
                                                 
3
 Involvement in non-political organizations is likely to help people develop skills that facilitate political 
participation; to introduce people to political networks; and to foster civic-mindedness, making people more 
likely to participate politically. However, it might also be that civic-minded individuals who are more likely to 
participate politically are more likely to join these organizations, or that political participation teaches a person 
skills relevant for non-political involvement and introduces him/her to networks that promote participation in 
non-political organizations (see the discussion in Brady et al., 1995; Verba et al., 1995; Norris, 2002). 
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offers from rulers who exchange personal favors for political support (see, e.g., Wantchekon, 
2003; Christensen and Utas, 2008; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; and Vicente, 2008). It has 
been suggested that clientelist offers stimulate political participation (Christensen and Utas, 
2008; Vicente, 2008), but also that the impact of clientelism may have an important gender 
dimension; common clientelist promises (e.g., government jobs) are often directed to men and 
might thus not be equally available to women (Wantchekon, 2003).  
To sum up, we anticipate that the gender gap in African political participation can be 
explained 1) by taking account of individual as well as contextual variation in the key 
determinants of political participation, and 2) by considering gender variation in not only the 
distribution but also the effects of these determinants. In the next section we discuss how to 
empirically evaluate the relative importance of these mechanisms.  
3 Data and empirical setup 
To investigate what factors underlie possible gender differences in African political 
participation, we use new data from the Afrobarometer survey. The Afrobarometer is a multi-
country survey project collecting data on political and economic attitudes and behavior of 
African citizens. As such, it provides a unique opportunity to study the gender gap in African 
political activity in a large multi-country sample. Round 4 of the Afrobarometer, conducted in 
2008-2009, covers over 27,000 respondents from 20 African countries – Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. The country samples range from 1,200 to 2,400 respondents and are 
representative of each country’s voting age population.4 
3.1 Dependent variables 
As dependent variable we consider electoral as well as inter-electoral political participation, 
i.e., voting and political activity taking place between elections. Thinking of political 
participation as citizen acts to influence the selection of and/or the actions taken by political 
representatives, it is a multidimensional concept that encompasses a wide and heterogeneous 
set of activities; on top of voting, citizens can work in election campaigns, engage in the local 
                                                 
4
 It should be noted that the Afrobarometer is not meant to be generalized to all of Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
selection of countries is biased toward countries that have undergone some degree of political liberalization, 
meaning that authoritarian regimes and countries in conflict are under-represented (for further details on the 
Afrobarometer sampling procedures and survey methods, see Bratton et al., 2005, and the Afrobarometer 
Network, 2007). 
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community, contact political leaders, attend demonstrations, etc. (for further discussion see, 
e.g., Verba et al., 1995; and Lijphart, 1997). Since we are interested in political participation 
in Africa, where political activity often takes place informally (Hirschmann, 1991; Bratton et 
al., 2005), capturing both electoral and inter-electoral political participation should be 
especially important.  
To capture electoral participation, we create a dummy variable taking the value one if the 
respondent reports to have voted in the last national election, and zero otherwise. Those who 
report to have been too young to register to vote are excluded from the estimation. To 
measure inter-electoral participation, we use a dummy for whether the respondent “got 
together with others to raise an issue” in the past year. This participation measure has several 
attractive properties: first, it is rather universal in the sense that it does not require any 
particular institutional context (as opposed to, e.g., having attended a village meeting), 
making it suitable for country comparisons; second, it is arguably a more active form of 
participation than voting, thereby broadening the types of political participation that we 
capture; and third, it is a relatively common activity (compared to, e.g., the alternative 
measure of having attended a demonstration).  
3.2 Explanatory variables 
On top of the gender dummy, which is our main explanatory variable, and some basic 
individual controls (age in years, age squared and a dummy for living in a rural area), our 
selection of independent variables is based on the discussion in Section 2, and thus includes 
individual level resources, employment and religious affiliation, and contextual (region) level 
averages of these. Since our sample is limited to 20 countries, we control for country level 
variation using country fixed effects.
5
 
With respect to the individual resource base, we measure the individual’s educational 
attainment using dummies indicating whether the respondent’s highest level of education is at 
the primary, secondary, or post-secondary level (using respondents with no schooling as the 
reference category). To capture economic standing, we follow Bratton et al. (2005) and create 
a “lived poverty index” covering how often, if ever, the respondent’s family has gone without 
enough food, clean water, medicines/medical treatment, and fuel relative to other respondents 
                                                 
5
 Studies trying to explain country level variation in participation include institutional approaches pointing to the 
importance of political institutions for determining country variation in electoral turnout (see, e.g., Jackman, 
1987; Lijphart 1997; Norris, 2002; Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos et al., 2004; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2007; 
Lindberg, 2004; and Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2008).  
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in the same country (see Table1). To capture information access, we include a dummy for 
owning a radio. While there is also information about how often the respondent listens to 
news on the radio, radio ownership should, conditional on controls for economic standing, be 
less endogenous in that it better captures the respondent’s access to, rather than interest in, 
information. Turning to employment, we use an indicator variable equal to one if the 
respondent has paid part- or full-time employment.
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To capture religious affiliations, we use a set of dummies indicating whether the 
respondent is an active member of “a religious group (e.g., church, mosque),” with separate 
dummies for being of Christian, Muslim, or some other faith. Non-religious or non-active 
members serve as the base category. While membership in religious groups may enhance the 
social capital and network of the respondent, so can membership in other community groups. 
However, since individual membership in non-religious community groups is likely to 
involve greater endogeneity than does religious affiliation (at least with respect to raising 
issues in the sense that if you want to raise an issue you may seek membership in community 
groups), we proxy for the availability of such recruitment networks with the share of the other 
respondents in the respondent’s your region who are members of a non-religious community 
group.  
To account for contextual variation, in line with the discussion in Section 2, we also 
aggregate the individual level variables by taking averages at the region level for each 
respondent excluding his or her own observation. While we might have captured more of the 
geographical variation by aggregating to the lower district level, the district sample sizes are 
small and hence also yield less precise estimates.
7
 Moreover, considering the suggested wide-
reaching effects of women taking part in education and employment (see the discussion in 
Section 2), implying that gender gaps in these variables may reproduce gender gaps in 
political participation, we also split the region level education and employment averages by 
gender. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 We have also tried running estimations where we consider part- and full-time work separately, but since it did 
not provide any additional insights we merge the two employment categories in the benchmark setup. 
7
 There are in total 246 regions, each with an average of 112 observations, as compared to 1,689 districts with an 
average of 16 respondents in each. 
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3.3 Estimation strategy 
3.3.1 Probit estimations 
Given our binary dependent variables, we initially run probit regressions on a pooled sample 
consisting of both men and women, of the form:  
(1)  γZβX  iiici Dy )1Pr( , 
where yi is our dependent variable, c  are country fixed effects, Di is a dummy for being 
female, Xi is a vector of individual explanatory variables (resources, information, 
employment, and demographic controls), and Zi is a vector of region level variables derived 
as aggregates from the other individuals within the region. By inspecting the marginal effect 
of being female rather than male (at the mean of all other explanatory variables), we assess to 
what extent the possible gender gap in participation can be explained by differences in the 
included variables. While the regional context does not vary across men and women, and 
hence should not affect the size of the gender gap, regional averages are included as a 
benchmark test of the hypothesized importance of contextual variables for participation. 
Expecting that there may not only be gender differences in the concerned variables, but 
also in their effects, in a next step we relax the pooling assumptions of equality of parameters 
for men and women.
 
An issue often overlooked in this context (Ai and Norton, 2003) is that 
when using probit regression, the introduction of interaction terms, for instance in order to let 
parameters differ between the genders, results in marginal effects that are difficult to interpret, 
as marginal effects differ both due to changes in parameters and changes in the expected 
probability of participating. This is especially problematic when one variable is introduced in 
several interaction terms at once, which would be the case with our gender dummy. In fact, 
not only are the significance levels of interaction term parameters incorrect for the marginal 
effects, not even the sign of the parameter needs to be the same as that of the difference in 
marginal effects. For this reason, we estimate the above equation for men and women 
separately using a linear probability model (i.e., an OLS on a binary dependent variable)
8
 of 
the form: 
(2)   iFiFiFciiici Dy   γZβXγZβX , 
                                                 
8
 As shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, we get very similar results if instead running probits and estimating the 
marginal effects at each sub-sample’s mean of the independent variables.  
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where notations are the same as in equation (1). An F superscript denotes parameters of 
interactions with the female dummy.
9
 In all the regressions above, we cluster the standard 
errors at the regional level, and use weights to ensure that equal weight is given to each 
country independent of sample size and that each country’s sample is nationally 
representative.  
4 Results 
As can be seen in Table 3, the gender gap in political participation varies across countries as 
well as between the different forms of participation. The gender gap in electoral participation 
is smaller than that in inter-electoral participation, and is not present in all surveyed countries. 
In fact, in six of the countries, the share of women who vote exceeds that of men, although 
except for in Botswana these “reverse” gender gaps are not statistically significant. Turning to 
inter-electoral participation in terms of joining others to raise an issue, on the other hand, 
participation rates are consistently significantly lower among women, the difference being 
more than five percentage points in all countries except Namibia and as high as 24 percentage 
points in Ghana. 
4.1 Pooled regressions 
4.1.1 Electoral participation  
Table 4 shows the marginal effects of probit regressions of our voting dummy, using a sample 
of both men and women under the pooling assumption of equal parameters. In a naïve 
estimation, controlling only for country fixed effects, age, and rural settlement (Column 1), 
women are 3.4 percentage points less likely than men to vote.
10
  
Introducing the individual resource variables (Column 2) brings only a modest reduction 
of the gender gap. Moreover, and in line with previous findings for Africa (see Isaksson, 
2010), whereas information access, here proxied by radio ownership, is positively related to 
voting, education and poverty are not. This seems to indicate either that a lack of resources in 
terms of education or money does not constrain participation to any larger extent, or that the 
                                                 
9
 We will present the results from these estimations by running each regression once for each gender (in which 
case the gender interactions will of course be dropped), and once in a pooled estimation to determine the 
differences in parameters between men and women (given by the interaction parameters). 
10
 Whereas the survey sampling procedure has made sure that there are no gender differences in any of these 
geographic variables, there is an age difference across the sampled men and women. Not controlling for this age 
difference increases the average gender gap to 4.7 percentage points. 
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enabling effect of resources is obscured by some motivational factor (e.g., clientelism) 
correlated with resource endowments.  
Column 3 introduces the employment variable and Column 4 the dummies for being an 
active member of a religious group. Both employment and religious membership may help 
build social capital and break domestic isolation, exposing individuals to new sets of norms 
and recruitment networks. In line with this, both come out positively related to voting. 
However, whereas employment implies a rather modest increase in voting, being an active 
religious believer increases the propensity to vote by around 4-6 percentage points for 
Christians and Muslims, and by approximately 8 percentage points for those of some other 
faith. Again, however, these variables seemingly do very little to explain the gender gap (if 
accounting for religiosity, the unexplained gap if anything becomes larger).  
Introducing the regional averages of the individual level variables (excluding the own 
observation) in Column 5,
11
 we see that, contrary to the individual estimates, living in a 
region with a high share of active Christians or Muslims is negatively related to voting (the 
difference between Christians and Muslims is not statistically significant). Hence, while being 
religiously active – Christian, Muslim or of some other faith – increases the likelihood that 
one will vote, living in a more religious society seems to have the opposite effect. Most of the 
regional resource and employment measures are, on the other hand, not significantly related to 
individual voting, and living in a region with a higher share of people with primary education 
is in fact associated with a lower probability to vote, possibly reflecting less mobilized voting 
(as opposed to autonomous participation, see Bratton et al., 2005) in regions where people are 
more educated. The positive (but only weakly statistically significant) correlation between 
individual voting and the share of other people in a respondent’s your region engaged in some 
non-religious community group could possibly support the importance of access to 
recruitment networks.  
4.1.2 Inter-electoral participation 
Turning to inter-electoral political participation, Table 5 presents the marginal effects from 
probit regressions of the dummy on whether the respondent “got together with others to raise 
an issue.” Controlling for country fixed effects, age, and urban-rural variation (Column 1), 
women have an approximately 12 percentage points lower participation rate than men. 
                                                 
11
 As mentioned earlier, considering that the region averages do not vary across men and women, and that an 
equal number of men and women have been sampled in each region, we do not expect the gender parameter to 
change due to the introduction of regional level averages.  
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 Unlike in the voting regressions, the individual resource variables (Column 2) are 
statistically significant and reduce the size of the observed gender gap, albeit quite modestly. 
The importance of education and access to information for inter-electoral participation is 
evident; the presented effects are large and highly statistically significant. Poverty, on the 
other hand, is in line with previous findings for Africa (Isaksson, 2010) positively correlated 
with inter-electoral participation, which is potentially explained by a higher motivation. All 
these effects remain stable throughout the different specifications in Table 5. 
Employment and religion are again positively related to participation (Columns 3 and 4), 
the sizeable effects presumably pointing to the importance of socialization and networks for 
inter-electoral political participation. Once more, however, they do little to explain the gender 
gap observed in Column 1. If anything, taking account of individual religiosity makes the 
unexplained gender gap even more pronounced.   
When adding the region level averages (Column 5), our findings again indicate that living 
in a region with a high share of active Christians or Muslims is indeed negatively related to 
participation in the pooled sample. However, we cannot yet determine whether this is due to 
gender-specific effects. Just as for voting, the regional resource and employment measures 
tend not to be significantly related to inter-electoral participation. The strong positive 
correlation between individual participation and the share of other people in the respondent’s 
region engaged in non-religious community groups, however, seemingly points to the 
important role of networks for inter-electoral participation.   
To sum up the results so far, we can note that the gender gap in political participation is 
considerably larger for inter-electoral participation than for voting. Arguably, the former – 
here measured in terms of how often the respondent gets “together with others to raise an 
issue” – constitutes a more active form of political participation. Moreover, and as opposed to 
voting, it takes place in groups rather than individually, and hence the importance of having 
access to a political network should presumably be greater. Whereas several of the included 
individual and regional explanatory factors stand out as important determinants of 
participation, as it turns out, they do relatively little to explain the observed gender gaps in 
electoral and inter-electoral political activity. Hence, gender inequality in participation can 
seemingly not be explained simply by women being, e.g., less educated.  
Given that we are unable to explain the gender gap in political participation by looking at 
differences in individual and regional characteristics alone, we now turn our attention to 
potential differences in the parameters of these variables. 
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4.2 Gender-specific regressions 
4.2.1 Voting 
Columns 1-2 of Table 6 present the results from gender-specific linear probability models of 
voting, including both the individual level variables and their regional averages. As noted in 
Section 3, we get very similar results if instead running probits (see Table A1), and using a 
linear probability model allows us to estimate the size and statistical significance of the 
differences in parameters between men and women. These differences are presented in 
Column 3. 
As it turns out, the individual level resource, employment, and religion variables all come 
out with parameters very similar to the marginal effects in Table 4, and with no statistically 
significant differences between men and women. One can note, however, that the relation 
between labor market participation and voting is larger and only statistically significant for 
women, possibly pointing to the importance of breaking their domestic isolation. 
Furthermore, considering that the positive associations observed between individual 
religiosity and voting apply to both women and men (if anything, they tend to be stronger for 
women), the results do not support the idea that religious norms reinforce gender inequality 
and thus work against female participation. Rather, they point to possible positive effects of 
religious activity, such as an increased social network.  
Turning to the contextual variables, the parameters of the region level resources, 
employment, degree of religiosity, and access to recruitment networks are again in line with 
the estimates in Table 4. Most importantly for our purposes, however, they are similar for 
men and women, suggesting that they are of limited importance for explaining the gender gap. 
Since it has been suggested that female political participation is negatively affected by 
traditional norms in more religious societies, the parameters of the regional religiosity 
variables are of special interest. Considering that we observe no statistically significant 
difference between the female and male parameters on the regional religiosity variables, our 
results do not support this claim.  
As argued in Section 2, there may also be reason to believe that women’s political 
participation depends on the capabilities of and interactions with other women in society, and 
the participation of women in other areas of society may help advance women’s participation 
in politics. Hence, in Columns 4-5 of Table 6 we introduce gender-specific regional averages 
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for education and employment
12
 (with the corresponding differences in parameters presented 
in Column 6). With gender-specific regional education averages, we can note that the 
parameters of the average levels of secondary schooling differ significantly across the male 
and female sub-samples. Whereas in the male sub-sample they are not statistically significant, 
in the female sub-sample both the average level of male and female secondary schooling 
come out significantly related to voting, but with opposite signs. Interestingly, while higher 
education among males in the region appears to stimulate female voting, higher education 
among other women in the region is negatively related (albeit only weakly statistically 
significant) to female voting. Again, an interpretation could be that this reflects less mobilized 
female voting (as opposed to autonomous participation, see Bratton et al., 2005) in regions 
where women are relatively educated, and more mobilized voting among women when men 
have more education than them, i.e., when there is a large gender gap in education. 
When it comes to gender-specific regional employment, previous literature has (as 
discussed in Section 2) pointed to the importance of women’s labor market participation in 
(re-)shaping gender roles. As in the case of education, neither the male nor the female 
regional employment rates are significantly related to individual voting in the male sample. In 
the female sub-sample, on the other hand, both average male and female employment are 
significantly associated with voting. Interestingly, whereas high male employment is 
negatively related to voting among women, high female employment is, in line with theories 
on the importance of women’s labor market participation, positively related (although only 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level). Since women generally do less paid work, a 
higher level of employment among women indicates a smaller gender gap in employment, 
and a higher level of employment among men indicate a larger gap. Hence, our results suggest 
that a smaller gender gap in employment is positively related to female political participation, 
but there is no such relationship for men. To the extent that the employment gap reflects and 
reinforces gender norms in society, this may be interpreted as evidence of effects of the 
prevailing gender roles. 
4.2.2 Inter-electoral participation 
Turning to inter-electoral political participation, Table 7 presents the results of gender specific 
linear probability estimations of our raised_issue dummy. As in Table 6, Columns 1 and 2 
                                                 
12
 These are two variables that display clear gender variation and for which we motivate the division into 
separate averages in Sections 2 and 3. For the sake of completeness, we have done the same for all individual 
level variables, but without any gain in insight. These results are available upon request. 
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present the results from estimations including the individual characteristics and regional level 
averages for the male and female sub-samples respectively, and Column 3 presents the 
differences in parameter estimates between men and women. Again, the role of individual 
resources for political participation is very similar across men and women. The exception is 
information; while owning a radio has a positive and statistically significant parameter in both 
sub-samples, it is about twice as large for men than for women. Hence, not only do women 
less frequently have access to information (see Table 2), owning a radio does not seem to 
stimulate participation to the same extent. One obvious explanation could be that men listen 
more to the radio than do women when the household possesses one. However, the difference 
between men and women reporting to frequently get news from the radio in the sample is 
small: 94 percent for men versus 90 percent for women owning a radio. Another explanation 
could be that the issues raised by men are different from those raised by women, and that the 
information obtained from a radio may be more relevant for men. Yet, with the data at hand 
we can only speculate as to whether this is true or not.  
Furthermore, there are no statistically significant gender differences in the parameters of 
the individual employment and religious affiliation variables. Hence, again there are no signs 
of individual religiosity holding women back from inter-electoral participation (if anything, 
the positive parameters on the individual religion variables are larger for women). In all, the 
results for the individual level variables are in line with those of Table 5 (and remain stable in 
Columns 4-5). 
Moreover, turning to the contextual variables, the parameters of the region level 
resources, employment, degree of religiosity, and access to recruitment networks in Columns 
1-2 are also in line with the estimates in Table 5, with no statistically significant parameter 
differences between men and women. Hence, again we find no support for the idea that living 
in a more religious society affects female participation more than male participation. 
Introducing the gender-specific regional averages for employment and education in 
Columns 4-5, the picture remains largely unchanged; only for the gender-specific regional 
levels of primary education do we observe statistically significant parameter differences 
between the genders. Contrary to what we saw for voting, there is a negative correlation 
between men’s education and women’s probability of joining others to raise an issue, and 
although the parameter of the average level of female primary schooling is not statistically 
different from zero in the individual sub-samples, it is significantly larger in the female 
compared to the male sub-sample. Conditional on the average level of education of women in 
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the region, having a higher level of male education (i.e., a gender gap in education) may 
reflect the existence of traditional gender norms speaking to the disadvantage of female 
political participation. Furthermore, using gender-specific regional employment averages, 
there are still no statistically significant differences in employment parameters across the male 
and female sub-samples.  
To sum up, comparing the effects of individual and region level variables on electoral and 
inter-electoral political participation, the parameters differ relatively little between men and 
women. One of the most interesting results in line with this concerns the effect of religion. As 
discussed, religion, and in particular Islam, has been suggested to reinforce traditional gender 
norms in society, thereby hindering change toward gender equality. What we observe here 
though is a relatively strong positive correlation between individual religious affiliation 
(irrespective of faith) and political participation. At the regional level, there is some evidence 
that living in a community where more people are members of religious groups has a negative 
effect on political participation, but there is no evidence that this association is different for 
women than for men. Hence, we find no support for hypotheses that living in more religious 
societies increases the gender gap in political participation. We have also found evidence that 
for women, a larger gender gap in employment seems to affect female voting negatively, 
while men were less affected. For inter-electoral participation, we observe a similar pattern 
for education.  
5 Conclusions 
This paper explored the factors underlying the gender gap in African electoral and inter-
electoral political participation. We argued that to try to understand the gender gap noted in 
some previous studies of African political activity, we need to go beyond individual 
determinants of participation and consider the contribution of contextual influences, as well as 
allow for gender differences in both the distributions and the effects of the central 
determinants. 
Commonly suggested determinants of political participation include individual resources 
relevant for meeting the costs of participating, motivating factors such as a will to conform to 
participatory norms, and access to political recruitment networks. In line with these general 
determinants, a lack of individual resources, low levels of female employment (in turn 
affecting women’s resource endowments, participatory norms, and access to recruitment 
networks), and the role of religion (especially Islam) as a carrier of traditional gender roles 
18 
 
have all been put forward as important factors explaining lower political participation among 
women. Our empirical estimations incorporate these factors as individual level determinants 
and region aggregates, and allow for gender variation in their effects. 
Empirical analysis of a new and comprehensive data material, covering political and 
economic attitudes and behavior of over 27,000 respondents across 20 African countries, 
suggests that while there is a gender gap in both electoral and inter-electoral participation, the 
gender gap in the latter, i.e., in political participation taking place in between elections, is 
considerably larger. Compared to voting, getting “together with others to raise an issue” – our 
measure of inter-electoral participation – takes place in groups rather than individually and 
arguably constitutes a more active form of political participation. As such, it presumably 
requires more in terms of inputs, motivations, and access to political networks, presumably 
working to the disadvantage of women. 
While several of the individual and contextual variables considered stand out as 
important determinants of general political participation, differing observable characteristics 
between men and women were found to explain only a very modest share of the gender gap in 
participation. The role of religion is particularly interesting though. First of all, we observed 
what appears to be a two-fold effect of religion, with individual religiosity being positively 
related to participation – presumably reflecting better access to political networks – and living 
in a religious society seemingly having a negative effect. Second, and contrary to suggestions 
in previous literature, we find no support for religiosity – neither at the individual nor at the 
contextual level – increasing the gender gap in electoral or inter-electoral participation. 
Allowing the effects of variables to differ between the genders strengthened this view; the 
observed positive effects of individual religiosity were highly similar for women and men. 
Likewise, the effect of living in a more religious community – whether Muslim, Christian, or 
other – was no different for women than for men.  
Furthermore, women’s voting tended to be positively correlated with women’s regional 
labor force participation, but negatively correlated with the labor force participation of men, 
while men’s probability to vote seemed unaffected by the regional labor market. This 
indicates that female voting may be negatively affected by a larger gender gap in 
employment, presumably pointing to the impact of community gender norms. Similar results 
are found for education for inter-electoral participation.  
To conclude, our findings indicate that differing observable characteristics between men 
and women explain only a very small share of the gender gap in political participation. Hence, 
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the gender inequality observed in African political participation, which for inter-electoral 
participation is quite substantial, can seemingly not be explained simply by differing 
characteristics such as women being less educated or participating less in the labor market. 
The fact that the lion’s share of the observed gender gaps remains unexplained in spite of 
controlling for a wide range of commonly suggested individual and contextual determinants 
of political participation suggests that some other factor is at play. The often suggested role of 
religion as reinforcing traditional gender roles does not seem to help explain the gender gap in 
participation. Rather, the strong positive associations observed between individual religiosity 
and political participation seem to indicate that religious affiliations provide access to political 
networks stimulating participation, among women as well as among men. The effect of the 
gender gap in employment – which was found to affect male voting positively and female 
voting negatively – may point to the impact of norms on gender roles. There is a need for 
future research to dig further into these factors. To address the millennium development goal 
of promoting gender equality and empowering women in the emerging African democracies, 
we need to better understand why the political participation of women lags behind that of 
men. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1. Variable descriptions. 
 
Variable name Description  
voted Voted in the last national election (dummy) 
raised_issue Joined others to raise an issue during the past year 
female Female dummy 
poverty_index A poverty index with mean zero and standard deviation one within 
each country, higher values meaning that you are poorer. 
Constructed as the first principal component of the answers to, 
'Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your 
family gone without: (a) enough food to eat, (b) enough clean water 
for home use, (c) medicines or medical treatment, (d) enough fuel 
to cook your food?’, with response categories ranging from 0 for 
’never’ to 4 for ’always’ for each item.  
primary Completed primary (only) dummy 
secondary Completed secondary (no tertiary) dummy 
tertiary At least some tertiary education dummy 
own_radio Dummy for owning a radio 
employed Working part or full time dummy 
christian Dummy for being an active Christian 
muslim Dummy for being an active Muslim      
other_religion Dummy for being active in another religion    
community_group Dummy for being a member of a voluntary association or 
community group 
reg_* Region average of *, excluding own observation 
reg_f_* Region average of * among women only, excluding own 
observation 
reg_m_* Region average of * among men only, excluding own observation 
age Age of respondent 
age2 Age squared (scaled by a division by 100 in order to make 
regression parameters larger) 
rural Rural dummy  
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Table 2. Summary statistics. 
 Full Sample    Male    Female  
 Mean Sd Min Max  Mean Sd  Mean Sd  
Dependents 
raised_issue 0.54 0.5 0 1  0.61 0.49  0.48 0.5 
voted 0.77 0.42 0 1  0.79 0.41  0.74 0.44 
Individual Resources 
poverty_index -0.01 1 -1.99 4.24  -0.02 1  0.01 0.99 
primary 0.36 0.48 0 1  0.36 0.48  0.36 0.48 
secondary 0.21 0.41 0 1  0.24 0.43  0.19 0.39 
tertiary 0.05 0.21 0 1  0.06 0.23  0.03 0.18 
own_radio 0.71 0.45 0 1  0.79 0.41  0.64 0.48 
Religion 
christian 0.37 0.48 0 1  0.34 0.47  0.39 0.49 
muslim 0.07 0.26 0 1  0.08 0.28  0.06 0.24 
other_religion 0.01 0.12 0 1  0.01 0.12  0.02 0.12 
Employment 
employed 0.34 0.47 0 1  0.41 0.49  0.28 0.45 
Regional Resources 
reg_poverty_index 0.01 0.32 -1.03 1.52  0.01 0.32  0.01 0.32 
reg_primary 0.36 0.15 0 0.9  0.36 0.15  0.36 0.15 
reg_secondary 0.21 0.16 0 0.82  0.21 0.16  0.21 0.16 
reg_tertiary 0.04 0.06 0 0.51  0.04 0.06  0.04 0.06 
reg_own_radio 0.71 0.12 0.14 1  0.71 0.12  0.71 0.12 
Regional Labor Market 
reg_parttimejob 0.15 0.11 0 0.68  0.15 0.11  0.15 0.11 
reg_fulltimejob 0.18 0.12 0 0.71  0.18 0.12  0.18 0.12 
Regional Religion 
reg_christian 0.36 0.23 0 1  0.36 0.23  0.36 0.23 
reg_muslim 0.07 0.13 0 1  0.07 0.13  0.07 0.13 
reg_other_religion 0.02 0.04 0 0.29  0.02 0.04  0.02 0.04 
Regional Networks 
reg_community_group 0.24 0.13 0 0.86  0.24 0.13  0.24 0.13 
Control Variables 
female 0.5 0.5 0 1  0 0  1 0 
age 36.35 14.46 18 110  37.8 15.14  34.89 13.6 
age2 15.31 12.81 3.24 121  16.58 13.73  14.02 11.67 
rural 0.62 0.49 0 1  0.62 0.49  0.62 0.49 
N 26,546     13,324   13,222  
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Table 3. Nationally representative (weighted) summary statistics of male and female political 
participation, by country (countries sorted by size of gender gap). 
 
 Voting      Raised issue   
Country Male Female Gap Gap s.e.  Country Male Female Gap Gap s.e. 
Nigeria 0.713 0.578 -0.135 0.022  Ghana 0.657 0.419 -0.238 0.031 
Burkina Faso 0.814 0.689 -0.125 0.028  Nigeria 0.519 0.311 -0.207 0.021 
Zimbabwe 0.704 0.590 -0.114 0.032  Mali 0.757 0.554 -0.204 0.029 
Kenya 0.880 0.771 -0.109 0.030  Benin 0.702 0.505 -0.197 0.030 
Mali 0.839 0.736 -0.103 0.026  Kenya 0.708 0.527 -0.180 0.035 
Uganda 0.784 0.683 -0.101 0.024  Burkina Faso 0.726 0.550 -0.176 0.030 
Madagascar 0.738 0.645 -0.092 0.035  Liberia 0.720 0.551 -0.169 0.031 
Zambia 0.678 0.596 -0.082 0.033  Uganda 0.637 0.473 -0.164 0.024 
Ghana 0.925 0.884 -0.041 0.021  Tanzania 0.765 0.605 -0.160 0.030 
Liberia 0.835 0.807 -0.028 0.028  Zambia 0.553 0.434 -0.119 0.032 
Tanzania 0.911 0.882 -0.028 0.022  Madagascar 0.604 0.493 -0.112 0.036 
Mozambique 0.810 0.787 -0.023 0.033  Zimbabwe 0.569 0.479 -0.090 0.032 
Benin 0.934 0.912 -0.022 0.017  Botswana 0.618 0.529 -0.089 0.030 
Namibia 0.788 0.788 0 0.028  Lesotho 0.684 0.595 -0.088 0.029 
Malawi 0.820 0.826 0.006 0.029  Mozambique 0.662 0.580 -0.082 0.033 
Lesotho 0.642 0.66 0.018 0.030  Malawi 0.763 0.685 -0.078 0.030 
Senegal 0.792 0.817 0.025 0.027  Senegal 0.651 0.573 -0.078 0.031 
South Africa 0.729 0.756 0.027 0.023  Cape Verde 0.356 0.289 -0.067 0.029 
Cape Verde 0.837 0.867 0.030 0.023  South Africa 0.419 0.355 -0.065 0.024 
Botswana 0.637 0.707 0.070 0.031  Namibia 0.342 0.325 -0.017 0.028  
Average 0.790 0.749 -0.041   Average 0.621 0.492 -0.129  
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Table 4. Pooled sample voting regressions (probit marginal effects). Dependent variable: 
voted.       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
female -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.030*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Resources 
poverty_index  0.002   0.003 
  (0.003)   (0.003) 
primary  0.005   0.008 
  (0.008)   (0.008) 
secondary  0.006   0.004 
  (0.011)   (0.010) 
tertiary  -0.020   -0.016 
  (0.018)   (0.018) 
own_radio  0.035***   0.032*** 
  (0.007)   (0.007) 
Employment 
employed   0.015**  0.013* 
   (0.007)  (0.007) 
Religion 
christian    0.044*** 0.046*** 
    (0.007) (0.007) 
muslim    0.055*** 0.054*** 
    (0.011) (0.011) 
other_religion    0.076*** 0.071*** 
    (0.017) (0.018) 
Regional Resources 
reg_poverty_index     -0.026* 
     (0.014) 
reg_primary     -0.190*** 
     (0.050) 
reg_secondary     -0.039 
     (0.056) 
reg_tertiary     -0.196 
     (0.127) 
reg_own_radio     -0.015 
     (0.044) 
Regional Employment 
reg_employed     -0.018 
     (0.043) 
 
continued …
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
  … continued 
Regional Religion 
reg_christian     -0.116** 
     (0.047) 
reg_muslim     -0.152** 
     (0.062) 
reg_other_religion    0.020 
     (0.105) 
Regional Networks 
reg_community_-     0.105* 
  group     (0.061) 
Additional Controls 
age 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
rural 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Country fixed yes yes yes yes yes  
  effects       
Observations 23,624 23,624 23,624 23,624 23,624  
Notes: Clustered (by region) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are 
weighted using combined within×across country weights. The within-country weights adjust the samples to be 
nationally representative. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size. 
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Table 5. Pooled sample voting regressions (probit marginal effects). Dependent variable is 
raised_issue. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
female -0.123*** -0.102*** -0.117*** -0.133*** -0.110*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Resources 
poverty_index  0.028***   0.025*** 
  (0.006)   (0.005) 
primary  0.070***   0.061*** 
  (0.010)   (0.010) 
secondary  0.104***   0.090*** 
  (0.014)   (0.013) 
tertiary  0.191***   0.173*** 
  (0.018)   (0.017) 
own_radio  0.074***   0.070*** 
  (0.009)   (0.009) 
Employment 
employed   0.049***  0.031*** 
   (0.010)  (0.009) 
Religion 
christian    0.179*** 0.165*** 
    (0.012) (0.012) 
muslim    0.152*** 0.169*** 
    (0.020) (0.018) 
other_religion    0.128*** 0.123*** 
    (0.036) (0.038) 
Regional Resources 
reg_povetry_index     0.015 
     (0.023) 
reg_primary     -0.104 
     (0.077) 
reg_secondary     -0.140 
     (0.088) 
reg_tertiary     0.255* 
     (0.153) 
reg_own_radio     -0.123 
     (0.083) 
Regional Employment 
reg_employed     0.004 
     (0.068) 
  continued …
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
  … continued 
Regional Religion 
reg_christian     -0.127** 
     (0.065) 
reg_muslim     -0.241*** 
     (0.090) 
reg_other_religion    -0.300 
     (0.224) 
Regional Networks 
reg_community_-     0.520*** 
  group     (0.087) 
Additional Controls 
age 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
rural 0.076*** 0.106*** 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.086*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Country fixed yes yes yes yes yes 
  effects       
Observations 26,346 26,346 26,346 26,346 26,346  
Notes: Clustered (by region) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are 
weighted using combined within×across country weights. The within-country weights adjust the samples to be 
nationally representative. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size. 
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Table 6. Gender-specific OLS estimations. Dependent variable: voted.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Sample: Male Female Diff (2-1) Male Female Diff (5-4) 
Resources  
poverty_index 0.005 -0.001 -0.007 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
primary -0.002 0.011 0.013 -0.002 0.011 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
secondary -0.008 0.002 0.010 -0.008 0.003 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) 
tertiary -0.019 -0.029 -0.010 -0.019 -0.028 -0.009 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.034) (0.023) (0.029) (0.034) 
own_radio 0.035*** 0.026*** -0.009 0.035*** 0.026*** -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) 
Employment 
employed 0.011 0.024** 0.013 0.011 0.024** 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
Religion 
christian 0.037*** 0.057*** 0.020 0.037*** 0.057*** 0.020 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) 
muslim 0.049*** 0.045** -0.005 0.049*** 0.045** -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) 
other_religion 0.052** 0.094*** 0.042 0.052** 0.095*** 0.043 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.042) (0.024) (0.033) (0.042) 
Regional Resources 
reg_poverty_index -0.019 -0.036* -0.018 -0.019 -0.035* -0.016 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) 
reg_primary -0.118** -0.210*** -0.093    
 (0.050) (0.063) (0.064)    
reg_m_primary    -0.066 -0.155*** -0.089 
    (0.056) (0.058) (0.063) 
reg_f_primary    -0.050 -0.077 -0.027 
    (0.059) (0.059) (0.064) 
reg_secondary -0.018 -0.019 -0.001    
 (0.067) (0.071) (0.072)    
reg_m_secondary    -0.034 0.125** 0.159** 
    (0.067) (0.063) (0.078) 
reg_f_secondary    0.018 -0.151* -0.168** 
    (0.071) (0.078) (0.083) 
reg_tertiary -0.226 -0.203 0.023    
 (0.166) (0.140) (0.129)    
reg_m_tertiary    -0.195 0.006 0.202 
    (0.152) (0.155) (0.145) 
reg_f_tertiary    -0.018 -0.208 -0.190 
    (0.237) (0.198) (0.181) 
reg_own_radio 0.013 -0.061 -0.074 0.015 -0.067 -0.082 
 (0.052) (0.060) (0.070) (0.053) (0.062) (0.073) 
  continued …
28 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Sample: Male Female Diff (2-1) Male Female Diff (5-4) 
Regional Employment 
reg_employed -0.022 -0.057 -0.035    
 (0.044) (0.048) (0.053)    
reg_m_employed    0.011 -0.141*** -0.152*** 
    (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) 
reg_f_employed    -0.037 0.098* 0.135** 
    (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) 
Regional Religion 
reg_christian -0.081* -0.124** -0.043 -0.079* -0.130** -0.052 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.049) (0.047) (0.053) (0.049) 
reg_muslim -0.126* -0.125** 0.002 -0.129* -0.108* 0.021 
 (0.067) (0.060) (0.068) (0.067) (0.059) (0.067) 
reg_other_religion -0.053 0.028 0.082 -0.060 0.054 0.114 
 (0.099) (0.123) (0.129) (0.101) (0.123) (0.137) 
Regional Networks 
reg_community_- 0.066 0.118* 0.051 0.067 0.108 0.040 
  group (0.060) (0.069) (0.068) (0.059) (0.069) (0.066) 
Additional Controls 
age 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.004* 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
age2 -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.004* -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
rural 0.034*** 0.043*** 0.009 0.034*** 0.043*** 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) 
country×gender yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  fixed effects        
Observations 12,014 11,610  12,014 11,610  
R-squared 0.090 0.106  0.090 0.107   
Notes: Clustered (by region) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are 
weighted using combined within×across country weights. The within-country weights adjust the samples to be 
nationally representative with respect to gender, region, urban-rural distribution, etc. The across-country weights 
adjust all country samples to the same size (N=1200). Columns 3 and 6 present the differences in OLS estimates of 
the gender-specific estimates in Columns 1-2 and 4-5 respectively. Standard errors of differences given by pooled 
regressions with a full set of interactions between gender and each variable.  
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Table 7. Gender specific OLS estimations. Dependent variable: raised_issue.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Sample: Male Female Diff (2-1) Male Female Diff (5-4) 
Resources 
poverty_index 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.000 0.022*** 0.022*** -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
primary 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.009 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.010 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) 
secondary 0.083*** 0.073*** -0.010 0.082*** 0.073*** -0.010 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) 
tertiary 0.162*** 0.157*** -0.005 0.162*** 0.157*** -0.005 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.030) (0.021) (0.027) (0.031) 
own_radio 0.082*** 0.044*** -0.038*** 0.082*** 0.045*** -0.037*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) 
Employment 
employed 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.004 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) 
Religion 
christian 0.143*** 0.161*** 0.018 0.143*** 0.161*** 0.018 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
muslim 0.152*** 0.158*** 0.006 0.152*** 0.158*** 0.006 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) 
other_religion 0.093** 0.135*** 0.042 0.094** 0.136*** 0.042 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.044) (0.041) (0.047) (0.044) 
Regional Resources 
reg_poverty_index -0.001 0.026 0.027 0.002 0.027 0.025 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) 
reg_primary -0.045 -0.144* -0.099    
 (0.069) (0.085) (0.065)    
reg_m_primary    0.056 -0.187** -0.243*** 
    (0.079) (0.089) (0.072) 
reg_f_primary    -0.099 0.044 0.142** 
    (0.075) (0.084) (0.071) 
reg_secondary -0.141 -0.124 0.017    
 (0.086) (0.089) (0.074)    
reg_m_secondary    -0.052 -0.130 -0.079 
    (0.117) (0.125) (0.088) 
reg_f_secondary    -0.078 0.003 0.081 
    (0.111) (0.108) (0.090) 
reg_tertiary 0.240 0.213 -0.027    
 (0.160) (0.155) (0.159)    
reg_m_tertiary    0.100 -0.006 -0.107 
    (0.194) (0.241) (0.173) 
reg_f_tertiary    0.151 0.189 0.038 
    (0.209) (0.259) (0.187) 
reg_own_radio -0.084 -0.127 -0.043 -0.065 -0.112 -0.048 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.082) (0.081) (0.087) (0.081) 
  continued …
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Sample: Male Female Diff (2-1) Male Female Diff (5-4) 
Regional Employment  
reg_employed -0.049 0.039 0.088    
 (0.062) (0.074) (0.063)    
reg_m_employed    -0.125* -0.066 0.060 
    (0.075) (0.084) (0.074) 
reg_f_employed    0.104 0.118 0.014 
    (0.084) (0.103) (0.094) 
Regional Religion 
reg_christian -0.084 -0.144** -0.060 -0.102* -0.165** -0.063 
 (0.061) (0.071) (0.063) (0.060) (0.073) (0.061) 
reg_muslim -0.195** -0.222** -0.027 -0.189** -0.215** -0.026 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.086) (0.089) (0.091) (0.087) 
reg_other_religion -0.354* -0.147 0.206 -0.338* -0.192 0.146 
 (0.182) (0.258) (0.177) (0.186) (0.275) (0.187) 
Regional Networks 
reg_community_- 0.443*** 0.451*** 0.007 0.447*** 0.441*** -0.006 
  group (0.076) (0.102) (0.101) (0.076) (0.104) (0.100) 
Additional Controls 
age 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.002 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
age2 -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.003 -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
rural 0.086*** 0.069*** -0.016 0.084*** 0.069*** -0.015 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
country×gender yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  fixed effects        
Observations 13,238 13,108  13,238 13,108  
R-squared 0.129 0.104  0.130 0.105   
Notes: Clustered (by region) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are 
weighted using combined within×across country weights. The within-country weights adjust the samples to be 
nationally representative with respect to gender, region, urban-rural distribution, etc. The across-country weights 
adjust all country samples to the same size (N=1200). Columns 3 and 6 present the differences in OLS estimates of 
the gender-specific estimates in Columns 1-2 and 4-5 respectively. Standard errors of differences given by pooled 
regressions with a full set of interactions between gender and each variable.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Marginal effects from probit and coefficients from OLS for men/women and both dependents. 
 Dependent: voted      raised_issue     
 Sample: Men   Women   Men   Women    
 Estimation: Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS Probit OLS  
poverty_index 0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
primary 0.002 -0.002 0.010 0.011 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
secondary -0.000 -0.008 0.005 0.002 0.090*** 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.073*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) 
tertiary -0.015 -0.019 -0.022 -0.029 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.167*** 0.157*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) 
own_radio 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.090*** 0.082*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
employed 0.009 0.011 0.021** 0.024** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) 
christian 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.151*** 0.143*** 0.173*** 0.161*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
muslim 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.046** 0.045** 0.157*** 0.152*** 0.171*** 0.158*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) 
other_religion 0.054** 0.052** 0.091*** 0.094*** 0.093** 0.093** 0.143*** 0.135*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.033) (0.040) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047) 
reg_poverty_- -0.018 -0.019 -0.033* -0.036* 0.001 -0.001 0.031 0.026 
  index (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025) 
reg_primary -0.146*** -0.118** -0.232*** -0.210*** -0.042 -0.045 -0.158* -0.144* 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.069) (0.063) (0.075) (0.069) (0.092) (0.085) 
reg_secondary -0.034 -0.018 -0.040 -0.019 -0.139 -0.141 -0.128 -0.124 
 (0.061) (0.067) (0.071) (0.071) (0.093) (0.086) (0.099) (0.089) 
reg_tertiary -0.211 -0.226 -0.184 -0.203 0.249 0.240 0.269 0.213 
 (0.147) (0.166) (0.133) (0.140) (0.172) (0.160) (0.177) (0.155) 
reg_ownradio 0.027 0.013 -0.054 -0.061 -0.087 -0.084 -0.146 -0.127 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.061) (0.060) (0.092) (0.083) (0.095) (0.086) 
reg_employed 0.001 -0.022 -0.044 -0.057 -0.041 -0.049 0.042 0.039 
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.054) (0.048) (0.070) (0.062) (0.080) (0.074) 
reg_christian -0.088* -0.081* -0.148** -0.124** -0.102 -0.084 -0.144* -0.144** 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.059) (0.055) (0.066) (0.061) (0.079) (0.071) 
reg_muslim -0.145* -0.126* -0.156** -0.125** -0.230** -0.195** -0.234** -0.222** 
 (0.078) (0.067) (0.068) (0.060) (0.102) (0.092) (0.101) (0.092) 
reg_other_ - -0.049 -0.053 0.076 0.028 -0.412** -0.354* -0.167 -0.147 
  religion (0.114) (0.099) (0.156) (0.123) (0.205) (0.182) (0.271) (0.258) 
reg_commu- 0.085 0.066 0.126* 0.118* 0.531*** 0.443*** 0.496*** 0.451*** 
  nity_group (0.067) (0.060) (0.075) (0.069) (0.087) (0.076) (0.113) (0.102) 
age 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
age2 -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
rural 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.094*** 0.086*** 0.075*** 0.069*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Country fixed yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
  effects           
Observations 12,014 12,014 11,610 11,610 13,238 13,238 13,108 13,108  
Note: Clustered (at region level) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
